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CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Appellant, v. 
HO SING et al., Respondents. 
Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting 
Owner.-An abutting landowner may be held liable for the 
dangerous condition of portions of the public sidewalk which 
have been altered or constructed for the benefit of his prop-
erty and which serve a use independent of and apart from 
the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are 
designed. 
[2] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner. 
-The duty to maintain portions of a sidewalk which have 
been altered for the benefit of abutting property runs with 
the land, and a property owner cannot avoid liability on the 
ground that the condition was created by or at the request 
of his predecessors in title. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Munici-
pality.-A city has the duty to keep sidewalks in safe condi-
tion, it is directly liable to pedestrians for failing to correct 
a dangerous condition of which it has notice, and it is notre-
lieved of responsibility in this regard merely because the 
condition was created or maintained by an abutting property 
owner who might also be liable to pedestrians for injuries re-
sulting therefrom. 
[4] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality: 
Liability of Abutting Owner.-With regard to persons who are 
injured by the defective condition of a sidewalk, which con-
dition was created or maintained by an abutting property 
owner, the city and the landowner are joint or concurrent 
tort feasors; each is directly liable for his own wrong and each 
may be held liable for the entire damage suffered. 
[5a, 5b] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Munici-
pality.-Even if a city has the right to contribution or in-
demnity from an abutting landowner for damages recovered 
from the city because of the defective condition of a sidewalk, 
the city's liability to pedestrians would not be merely de-
pendent or derivative from that of the landowner. 
[1] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of 
part of private driveway which is within street, note, 59 A.L.R. 
441. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets, § 224 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., High:ways, § 364. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 7] Streets, § 74; [3, 5] Streets, 
§ 71; [4) Streets, §§ 71, 74; [6] Contributions, § 8. 
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[6] Contributions-Joint Tort Feasors, 
trihution Jwtween tort ft·a~ors ndmib or ,;(>Jl!E 
nnd a ri"·ht of indPmnilientiou lllllY ari~e a l'<'onlt of eon-
tract i>l', equitable eonsidtTntions. and not reol rided to 
situations involviJig' a wholly vi(oarions linbility. 
[7] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting 
Owner.-\\'here an adjoining property cnvuer for the exelusive 
!Jpnefit of his own property plaees in a publie stret't or side-
walk some artificial structure and a city is eOillpellt•ll to pay-
in limnagcs to a member of Uw puhlie injnrNl 
thereby, the has a right to retOVPl' the amount so paid 
from the property owner wny of ind<'mnif.v. 
APPBAI, from a judgment oi' the Superior Court of the 
City and County oi' San Francisco. ,John B. :Molinari, Judge, 
Reversed. 
Aetion by a munic:ipality to rPeover indemnity for the 
amount it was eompe1led to pay a pedestrian for injuries re-
c-eived when she fdl over a defedive skylight in a sidewalk in 
front of defendant's premise>i. ,J ndgmeni for dcfeudant 
after sustaining demurrer to eomplaint witltont leave to 
amend, reversed. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and George E. Eaglin, 
Deputy City Attorney, for Appellant. 
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and Frank E. Farrella for 
Hespondents. 
CAR'rER, J.-'rhis is an appeal by the city and county of 
San lj'rancis<:o, a munic-ipal eorporation, from a judgment 
after defendants', Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee, flemurrer to 
its complaint had been sustained without leaye to amend. 
Mr. and 1\Irs. IIo purehased a building in San Francis<:o. 
Their preder:essors in ti1le had installed a sidewalk skylight 
in front of the building. This skylight 11·as over a basement 
whieh was maintailled by defendants lio. During the eourse 
of defc•ndants' pos;;ession of the building, l lw sidewalk sky-
light developed a n~H:k two inelws wi(le and 18 iw·hes long. 
On August 24, Hl52, one Mrs. \Vaguer tripywd he\'anse o£ ;;aid 
craek and fell, breaki11g her hip. l\Ir. and MrC<. \Vagner sued 
both the r:ity and eounty of San b'raneist·o and Mr. and 
Mrs. Ho for damages resulting tlwrd't·om ( l.Y illf1tcr v. City 
& Connty of San Francisco ct a/., No. 12356.'2) and recovered 
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final against plaintiff city and defendants Ho 
a total amount of $15,000 plus interest and costs. Plaintiff 
lVIrs. \Vaguer the sum of $5,000 plus $102.03 costs. 
Defendants paid Mrs. \Vagner the sum of $10,000. 
Plaintiff, in bringing this action, seeks to defendant;; 
to it in the sum of $5,258.87 ($5,000 plu;; costs and 
) . As heretofore noted, the trial court sustained 
defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint without leave 
to amend. 
The only question involved is one of first impression h1 
this state and may be stated as follows: 'Where au adjoining 
property owner for the exelusive benefit of his own property 
places in a public street or sidewalk some artificial structure 
and a city is compelled to pay compensation in damages to a 
member of the public injured thereby may the city recover 
the amount so paid from the property owner by way of 
indemnity~ 
This question was specifically left open in Peters v. City d'; 
County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 419, 430 [260 P.2d 55], 
where we said: "\Ve are not presented with the problem 
whether the city might have a right over against the Duques 
in the event it pays the judgment and the jury returns a 
verdict against the property owners on a new trial, and 
nothing we say here should be taken as indicating our views 
on that matter.'' Both sides argue, however, that from certain 
statements made in the Peters case, there is, or is not, a right 
over against the property owner in the case at bar. 
In the Peters case the plaintiff brought suit against both 
the city and the Duques, as property owners, for damages 
sustained by her from a fall oecasioncd by a ramp or slope 
extending from a building maintained by the Dnques and 
whieh extended across the sidewalk and caused a depression 
therein. 'l'he jury found for the plaintiff against the city 
but against the plaintiff with respect to the Duques' liability. 
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment against the city and re-
versed that portion \vhich exon<>rated def<>ndant Duque from 
liability. 
[1] \Ve held that: ( 1) "The rule is that an abutting land-
owner may be held liable for the dangerous condition of 
portions of the public sidewalk which have been altered or 
constructed for the benefit of his property and whieh serve 
a use independent of and apart from the ordinary and ac-
customed use for which sidewalks are designed"; [2] (2) 
























la ;md a prop<Ti~' mnwr <'.'llll!Ol' Hvoid on 
g'J'Olllld thai the eondiiion 1\'ils J·n·aied or :11 ilH' n•qw·st of 
hi,; in title' : [3a] 
1luty to ](('('fl :-;i1kwalks i!l sal'c eotHlil li>1hle 
io pedestrians for failing· to em·t·,•d a eondition 
of \\'hieh it had notiec, and it is not reliPved of it,; 
bility in this r<:>gard nwrely 1WC'HUS<: ihe condition was t·r·Nttell 
or maintained a propert:; OWJWl' ·who al~o he 
liable to JH•destJ·ians for injnrie'l resulting therefrom"; all([ 
[4] ( 4) "!Yith reuard to persons who are by such 
a condih'on. the city and the l(l11rlowuer arc )oiill or cmtCII1'1'cnt 
tort each is dirC'ctly liable his o1rn wronu and 
mch may be held liable for the entire 
(Emphasis added; Peters Y. & 
41 Cal.2d 41!!, 428, 427, 42~J [2GO P.2ll 
eited.) 
Prom the emphasized portion ( 4) set forth ddt:nd-
ants argue that sinc•e the ahuiting property owner and tbr' 
city arc joint, or (~Oneurrent, tortfeasors, the long established 
rule in this state against eonteibution brtween joint tort-
feasors applies. The city, on the other hand, argues that this 
is not a question of contribution but of indemnity. [5a] vVe 
said in the Peters case that "Even if sueh a right to con-
tribution or indemnity were recognized, ho\\·evrr, it would 
not mean, as assrrted by the eity, that its liability io 
pedestrians is merely dependrnt or derivative from that of 
the landowner and not joint or clireet. [6] As noted above, 
the rule against eontribution betwPcn joint tort feasors admits 
of some exc-eptions, and a n'ght o J may arise 
as a result of contmct or equitable considcraUons and is not 
restricted to situations involYing a wholly viearions liability, 
such as where a master has paid a judgrneut for damages 
resulting from the Yoluntary ad of his sernwt." ( 41 Cal.2d 
419, 480, 431.) The eity contends that when an abutting 
landowner makes an mmsual usc of the public strePts for hi,; 
owu private benefit it is with the permission, either express 
or implied, of the munieipality; that sm·h permission carries 
with it an implied condition that the landowner \Yill exercise 
due care for the safety of the public- and 1hat it \Yill hold the 
eity harmless for any damages oceasionrd by the laek of due 
eare. In other words, indemnity, as distinguished from 
contribution, exists because of some special relationship ex-
isting behveen the two tortfeasors and the entire loss is 
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;;:hiftrd to the one bouml to indemnify. (Prosser on 'forts, 
2d eel., § 46, p. 249.) In Rnnyon v. City of Los 40 
889 [180 P. 837], it was hrld: "The abutting 
ow11er, whose title extrnc1s to the f!enter of tlw may 
c>xeavate a yanlt or eellar under the sidewalk. Such owner, 
with of: tbe authorities, rxprcss or implied-
after a rca:mna hlt; no ob-
has been made the proper offkials---may insert in 
the sickwal k, for the purpose of admitting light and air to 
the vanlt or an iron grating, or othrr similar device, 
if alld properly constructed, and such contrivance in 
the sidewalk is not a nuisallce per se. (Rider v. Clark, [132 
Cal. 382 P. 564)] snpm; Morrison v. Avoy, 7 CaL 
37 P. 6261; Hirsch v. James 8. Remick Co., 38 
Cal.App. 764 [117 P. 876]; Fisher v. l'hiTkell, 21 Mich. 1 
[ 4 .Am.Hep. 422] .) " 
'THE CrrY's ARou:~mNT 
It is the position of the city that in the absence of confliet 
with the constitutional or statutory law of this state, the com-
mon law prevails (Civ. Code,§ 22.2; Cole v. Bush, 45 Cal.2d 
845, 335 P.2d 460, 54 A.hR.2d 1187]) awl that the com-
mon law is eonsistent throughout the United States that in-
demnity is allowed in such a situation as we have here. 
The eity cite::; numy eases from out-of-state courts in whieh 
has been allmn'cl. 'l'he theories relied on by such 
('ourts haYe differed as has lwen heretofore noted by us iu the 
Pei ers ease. \Ve said there: ''The opinious in those eases, 
however, recoguize that the city ha~ an independent duty 
to coned dangerous conditions of which it has noticr, regard-
less of who created them, and the term 'seeondary' is not used 
therein to indicate that the city is merely liable vicariously 
for the lJPg]igencc of the landowner. Instead, it appears that 
the terrn is used as a means of indicating that, in the jnrisdic-
tion whe1·e the r:ase arose, a eity llas a right to be indemnified 
by a landowner in the event it is compelled to pay damages 
n'rmlting from a dangerous eondition he created or mnintainecl 
ancl for whif~h he would be liable to pedestrians. In this regard 
it may be noted that a mimlwr of jurisdictions whieh adhere 
to the ricw tlwi the eity and the laudo1nwr are joint or eon-
current tort fea,ors make an to the general rule 
('(mtrilmtiou bet wce11 joint and lwl(l that 
a nnmieipality has a right to be ilHlcmnified by the property 
owner in such a situation. (Chicago v. Robbius, 67 U.S. 418, 
132 CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. v. Ho SING [51 C.2d 
425 [17 L.Ed. 298, 302-303]; Washington Gaslight 
Co. v. District Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 [16 S.Ct. 564, 568, 
40 hEd. 712]; Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266 
[159 P.2d 149, 157-158, 160 A.L.H. 809, 821-822J; City of 
Tuscaloosa v. Pair, 282 Ala. 129 [167 So. 276, 27H]; Oulf, 
JJfobilc d'; Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Di:r:on Co., ;348 Ill. 
App. 148 N.E.2d ; 19 MtQnillin, Municipal 
Corporations [1950], § 54.19, pp. 91-94; Prosser on Torts 
, p. 1116; 1 Freeman on Judgments [5th er1. j, § 477, 
p. fJ80.) " ( 41 Cal.2d 41fJ, 480.) 
In 1.Yas71 Gaslight Co. v. District 161 
l'.S. :n6, 32:5, 827, 328 [16 S.Ct. 564, 40 L.Ed. 712], the dis-
triet had the gas company permic;sion, for whieh it was 
paid a dollar, to open the sidewalk to install a gas box which 
loontained a cock in the service pipe. 'l'he box had an iron eover 
wllich when loeked in place was :flush with the surfaee of the 
sidewalk. After the installation of the box, the distrid ransed 
the sidewalk to be widened so that the box was approximately 
in the eenter thereof. 'l'he gas box was left open by the eom-
pany and a pedestrian fell as a result thereof and was in-
jured. She brought suit against the district and recovered 
a judgment for surh damages. The distriet thereafter brought 
an aetion for indemnity against the gas eompany to recover 
the damage's it had been foreed to pay. 'l'he Supreme Court 
of the United States, in affirming a ;judgment for the plaintiff 
district against the gas company, held: "It won1l1 1w unrea-
sonable to infer that Congress, when it authorizct1 the use 
of the streets or sidewalks for the purposes of the (;as Com-
pany's business, contemplated that the c:ity of \Vashington 
or its successor, the Distriet of Columbia, ~honld keep in 
repair such apparatus, the continued location of which iu the 
sidewalks of the eity was permitted, not only as an ineirlent 
to the right to make and sell gas, but also for the pecuniary 
benefit of the Gas Company. We eondude, therrfore, that the 
duty was imposed upon the Gas Company to supervise and 
keep the gas box iu repair. 'l'his duty not only doe:'> not eon-
:flid with the charter of the eompany, but on the eontrary is 
sanetioned by its tenor·, and is imposed as :.tn ineviiahlP ae-
tessory of the powers which the eharter (•onfe1·s .... 
"Second. Iia<Z the District a cause aefion auainst the 
Gas Compa.ny resulting from the fact that ·it ll<ul been con-
demned to pay damages occasioned by the gas box, 
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answer to this proposition is rendered 
and This eourt said 
Y. Blark (U.S.], 418, 422 [17 hEd. 
: 'li is well settled that a munieipal e.orporation having 
the exel usive <·are and control of the streets, is obliged to see 
that arc kept safe for the passage of persolls and prop-
and to abate all nuisanees that might prove dangerous; 
and if this plain duty is neglected. and any one is it 
is liable for the damages sustained. The corporation has, 
however, a remedy oyer against the party that is in fault, and 
has so used the streets as to produce the injury, unless it was 
also a \Hongdocr.' And the same doctrine is reiterated in 
almost the ideuticallauguage in Robbins v. Chicago, 4 \Vall. 
.s.J 6::>7, 670 r18 hEd. 427]. 
''The prinei ple thus announeed qualifies and restrains 
within just limits the rigor of the rule whi<'h forbids recourse 
between wrongdoers. In the leadiJJg ease of LowelL v. Boston 
& Lowell Railroad [40 1\las;;.] 23 Pid{. 24, 32 f34 Am.Dee. 
33], tlJC dodrine was thus stated: 'Our law, lwwever, does 
not iu eve1·.r c·asc <1isallow an adion, b,\· one 1vrongdoer against 
another, to recover damages ineurred in consequence of their 
joint offense. 'l'he rule is, in pari delicto potior est conditio 
clefenclentis. If the parties are not equally criminal, the 
principal delinquent may be held responsible to his eo-delin-
quent for damages incurred by their joint offence. In respect 
to offeuces, in whieh is involved any moral delinquency or 
turpitude, all parties are deemed equally guilty, and eourts 
will not inquire into their relative guilt. But where the of-
fenc-e if' merely malwn prohibitum, and is in no respect im-
moral, it is not against the poliey of the law to inquire into 
the relative delinquemy of the parties, and to administer 
justice between them, although both parties are wrongdoers.' '' 
(161 e.S., pp. 325, 327, 328.) In the "Statement of the 
Case" (pp. 318, 319) it was noted that it was the district's 
duty to inspeet, at the first of each month, the various gas 
boxes in the sidewalks. 
Cases from other jurisdictions also drav; a distinction be-
tween "aetiYe" and "passive" negligenee in holding that 
the municipality is entitled to indemnity from the landowner 
using the public ways for his own personal benefit and thereby 
causing injury to a member of the public entitled to use the 
sidewalk or street in the customary way. (City of Spokane v. 
Crane Co., 98 Wash. 49 [167 P. 63, 64]; Salt Lake City v. 
Schubach, 108 Utah 266 [159 P.2d 149, 155] .) 
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'['he following' qnoiat ions demr!n:,ll'ilk 1 he 
thai in !nation ;,w·h a:.; we llav1: i11 1 liP •·He:<' 
ol' other id.it>ns generally a,:n':' tlwi t 
or sh011ld a 1·ight of al'tiOil onT ng·ni 
owner 1rhosc negligent use of the i" wayc; has vam;ed it 
to Leeome liable in to a m<'lll hrr oft he w. 
ln lfl M1·Quillin, Mnnieipnl 
tion G~.J!I, pages Dl-fl~, it iR 
mnnil'ipality to reeover ove1· nst the party J 
for the has heen rstablished so 
now questioned,' the leading authority in support of' th rn1o 
being a de1·isioH of the United States 1d1ieh 
haR been approYed or followed in munerons ea:,es." In 4 
Dillon. l\i[un ieipal Corpo1·ations, fd't h 
page 3082, it is sai<l : "If a 111 nn 
liable for damages sustained in eollsc•qlH'lH'P of 1lw unsafe 
eondition of the sidewalks or -it lias a over 
against lhc person 1chose wronuful act or conduct the side-
walk or street was Tendered unkss thr rorporation was 
itself a wt·ong-doel', as behYcen itself and the author of the 
nuisanec• .... " A11d in Prosser on 'rorts, scc:ond edi lion, 
page 2GO, it i:;; noted that "Again, it is quite getwrally agreed 
that there may be indemnity in favor of: one who was U!Hler 
only a c;ec·ondary duty where another \\·as respon-
sible, as where a municipal corporation, held liable for failure 
to keep its streets in safe condition, seeks reeoyery from the 
person IYho created the eondition or a property mvner who 
permitted it.'' 
In Monsch Y. l'cllissia, 187 Cal. 790, 792, 7~JJ [204 
P. 224], where plaintiff '\Yas injnrec1 be:"anse of the dci'ective 
condition of a light-well in the sidewalk in front of defend-
aut's property, the eourt said: '' as the 
light-1vells, as suel!, -were, as we haYe seen, eonstrueteil for 
the lwndit of' defendant and her property and for a n:;e inde-
pcndellt of and apart from the ordinary and aeeustomed use 
ol' the sidewalk, the law c·asts upon het the duty, to be dis-
ehargrd \Yith reasonable l'ill'l', of keeping it iu proper and 
safe condition .... 
''] n other words, undrr the facts of this ease, thr du i y was, 
in tl1c first 1:nstance, itldcpendent of uotice to or the eity, 
cast npon the defendant to repair the gratings." (FJmpha,,is 
added.) (See also Sc:rton v. Brool:s, 89 Cal.2d ];)8, 1G7 [24G 
P.2d 496]; Granucci v. Claascn, 204 Cal. 509 [269 P. 437, 
59 A.IJ.R. 485] .) 
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also contends that the municipality's right of 
aetion over the landowner in such a situation should 
be allowed in the interests of equity and justice; that it is 
inequitable to hold the taxpayers liable for the negligent 
maintenance of a structure in the public sidewalk which inures 
to tlw lnndowncr 's private benefit. 
'l'lw also argues tl1at to hold the city liable in damages 
for sueh 1andowner's negligence constitutes a gift of public 
fnnds in violation of article IV, section 31, of the Constitu-
tion of California whi<:h provides, in part, that "The Legis-
lature shan have no power to give or to lend ... the credit 
of . . . any . . . and county . . . in aid of or to any 
person . . . or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner 
whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any indi-
vidual. ... " 
As a final argument the city contends that in the enactment 
of section 873 of the Code of Civil Procedure whieh became 
effeetivc on January 1, 1958, the Legislature expressly recog-
nized that there is a distinction in California between the 
right to indemnity and the right to contribution. Section 875, 
whieh provides for contribution between joint tortfcasors, 
sets forth in subdivision (f) that '"l'his title shall not impair 
any right of indemnity undee existing law, and where one 
tortfeasor ;judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from an-
other there shall be no right of contribution between them." 
THE DEFENDAKTS' ARGUMENT 
Del'cndants eoutencl that the Peters ease laid down the rule 
that the and the landowner are each liable for their sepa-
rate w1·ongfnl acts; that they are joint and concurrent tort 
feasorFJ; that there is no to contribution among joint 
tortfeasors in California.'~ 
Drfendants rely on Smith v. Fall River J. U. High School 
Dist., 1 Cal.2d 331, 334, 3:35 [34 P.2d 994]. In the Smith 
ease, plaintiff was injured as the result of a collision between 
a school bus owned and operated by one Fitzwater in which 
r-;he 1n1s a pass\'llg'rr and an automobile driYen by one Peatt. 
FilzY>ater had an agTE'ement with the school district whereby 
it paid l1im so mneh per month to transport pupils, living 
withiH the rli">trid, hy lms to sebool. Plaintiff sued the school 
(tistrid, Fitz1·,'at\•r, the (lriY(T of the bns, and Pratt, on ac-
*As heretofore not0d, thiH rule was ebangcd the Legislature in 19G7 
by the ndditi'lll of section 87.> of tllc Code of Proc0dure, effective 
.January 1, Hl:)8. 'l'hc present ac-tion arose in 19.32. 
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eount of their eoneurring negligence as the cause of her 
lilJUries. She reeovered judgment against all three defend-
ants. All three defendants appealed, but only the district and 
Fitzwater gave a bond on appeal to stay exeeution. The 
Independenee Indemnity Company was the surety on the 
hond. The judgment was affirmed and the Independent In-
paid plaintiff the f:ull amount of tl1e judg-
ment. The satisfaction of judgment executed the plain-
tiff wat> not filrd until Pratt movrd the court to eompd its 
entry. The motion was granted by the trial eonrt and the 
indemnity cornpany appealed. At the time of thr hearing of 
the motion, it appeared that prior to the accident Independ-
ence ludenmity Company had contracted in writing with the 
school district to insure it aud Fitzwater against any such 
loss occasioned by the use of the school bns. 'l'he indemnity 
company eontended that it was entitled to be suhrogatecl to the 
rights of the plaintiff against all three defendants because of 
the stay bond given by it. The court held that if the '' ap-
pellant's sole liability to the parties herein was that incurred 
under said stay bonrl, its position is undoubtedly correet." It 
was held that "As appellant cannot recover from either the 
dish·iet or Pitzwatcr by reason of its indemnity bond, can it 
reeover against the rrspondent rPratt] whose negligence con-
curred \Vith that of Fitzwater in causing plaintiff's injuries 1 
It is well settlrcl in this state that there is no n·ght of con-
tribution between joint lort-feasors whose concurrent negli-
gence has made them .iointly liable in damages. (Admns v. 
White B1ts Line, 184 Cal. 710 [195 P. 389] .) 'fherefore, had 
either of the two defendants, the srhool distriet or Fitzwater, 
paid said judgment, no claim for contribution against the re-
spondrnt could have bern made by the defendant making said 
payment. Neither could the appellant, after paying the judg-
ment as the indemnitor of the two defendants, the sehool 
distriet and Piizl\·ater, c-ompel contribution or recoYrr an~T­
thing from the respondent, a joint tort-feasor with the other 
two defendants. This was the point involved and definitely 
settled in the casP of Adams v. White Bns Line. SU[Wa." 
(Emphasis added.) 'fhe eourt went on to hold that had the 
indemnity company had only the stay or appeal bond aud 
had there been no indemnity insurance the holding in La 
li'lettr v. M.A. Burns Lmnber Co., 188 CaL 321 [205 P. 102], 
"WOuld have applied. In the l..Ja Fleur case the surrty upon 
tho appeal or stay bond paid the judgment and wa;;; held en-
titled under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be 
-
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to all the rights of the plaintiff in the action in 
which its pr.incipal had been defendant. 
Defendants rely on Dow v. Snnset Tel. & :Tel. 
188, 139 [121 P. 879], in support of their that 
the California courts do not draw a distinction brtween 
"passive" and "active" negligence. In the Dow case plain-
tiff was the employee of the Sunset Telephone and 'f0legt'aph 
Company. The facts showed that the telephone company had 
Ol'iginall.v strung its wire too close to wires of the Oakland 
Gas, I.1ight and Heat Company. The wires of the Oakland 
light company were improperly insulated and the rontact be-
tiveen the installations of the two companies produced a dan-
gerous supercharge of electricity. An employee of the Oak-
land company reported the danger to his superior but it took 
no steps either to eorrect the trouble or to warn tlw tc1cphont> 
company. Plaintiff was assured by his superior in the tele-
phone company that the wire was not supercharged with 
electric-ity and while making an investigation of' some trouble 
·with the telephone wire was seriously injured as a r0suJt of an 
electric shock received from one of the telephone wires. He 
brought an action against both cornpaniE>s and recovered a 
judgment which was affirmed on appeal (Dow v. Sunset 
Tel. & :Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182 [106 P. 587]). Plaintiff col-
lected the entire judgment from the Oakland Gas, I-"ight and 
Heat Company and thereafter it sought eontribution from 
the telephone eompany. ThE> court held: "Both companies 
were liable, but appellant insists that it was only passively 
guilty of a tort and that therefore it comes within an excep-
tion to the general rule above stated. With this view we 
eannot agrre. It was the separate duty of each to take thor-
ough precautions. Any aeeident due to neglect of snf'h duty 
made the corporations jointly liable." The conrt in the 
Dow case cites Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 14~) CaL 569, 
573 [87 P. 24], and Fowdcn v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 
149 Cal. 151, 157 [86 P. 178], in support of its statPment that 
there is no contribution between joint tort feasors. In all 
three of these eases contribution was sought by one joint tort 
feasor against the other. It is eonced0d that the rule in Cali-
fornia has always been that there ean be no enforerd eon-
tribution between joint tort feasors. In the ease at bar, how-
ever, the city seeks indemnity from <1efE'ndants because of the 
speeial licensor-licensee relationship existing between them 
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Defendant 
(On\'. Cod••. § il~-lOGO, G:Wfl 1) "evideneed a s1 ron;,?: pnl1l i(•. 
poli<·y in f'ayor of plaeing fimm,·ial responsihilit.v 011 a 
!'or failure to keep its pu hlie ways in safe eondi t ion"; that 
if' the (•ity j,, entitled to indemnity from tlw property owner 
it will exonerate thr city from all responsibility for ih; own 
m•gled. [3b] \Ye held iH the Peters ease Cal.2<l 410, 
429) that tl1e city was direetly liable to for fail-
ing to eorrcd a dangerous condition of whieh it ha(l notiee 
and "it is not rdiewd of its responsibility in this regard 
merely lw(:ause the condition was ercatc(l or maintained by a 
property OWllPr \YhO might also rH' liable to pedestrian;:; for 
illjuriPs resulting therefrom." [5b] We also held that 
"Even if such a right to contribution or indrmnity wPre 
recognized, howrvrr, it would not mean, as asserted by the 
c·ity, that its liability to pedestrians is merely dependent or 
derivative from that of the landowner and not joint or 
direct." (Pp. 430, 431.) 
[7] We eonelnde that where an adjoining property owner 
for the exclusive benrftt of his own property places in a 
publie street or sidewalk some artificial strueture and a city 
is compelled to p:l.~' eompem:at;_,,n in (1mnage:; to a membrr of 
the public injured thereby the city has a right to recover the 
amount so paid from the property owner by way of indemnity. 
In so holding, we do not depart from our holr1ing in the 
Peters case quoted just above. '\Ve affirm our statement there 
that in holding that the eity has a right over against the 
property owner we clo not mean that the city's liability to 
the injured member of the public is merely dependent or de-
rivative ancl not joint or direct. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C .• J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., eon-
cnrred. 
SCIIAUEH, .J., Dissenting.-~It is my view that inasmuch 
as the eity >Yas held liable to the injured pedestrian, Mrs. 
\Vaguer, beeause of its own failure to perform obligations 
owed direetly to her, no re(·oyery over ;;honld be permitted in 
the eity ':-; favor as against t!w abutting property owner. This 
eondnsion is emphasized hy the further faet that ::\Irs. \Vaguer 
would 11ot lun·e sustained her injury if the eily had not 
negleeted to per.form tlw duty it owed to her. As hereinafter 
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shown the majority creates a new right and enforces 
it retroactively. 
By adoption of the Public Liability .Act in 1923 (now Gov. 
Cod0, § 53051) the Legislatnre imposed upon municipalities 
liability to persons inj nred from the dangerous or defective 
condition of si reets and sidewalks "if the legislative body, 
board, or person authorized to remedy the condition: (a) Had 
knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition. 
(b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge oe 
rcet'tvmg fail0d to remedy the condition . . " (Gov. 
Code, § 5::!051; see also Facl-~1·cll v. City of Son Dieao (1945), 
26 Cal.2d J 203, 208 [9] f1:J7 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.H. 773]; 
Ackers v. City of Los Anwlcs (1940), 40 Cal..App.2cl 50, 53 
[104 P.2d 399]; Jones v. City of Sou.th San Francisco (1950), 
96 Cal.App.2d 427, 430-43:3 [216 P .2d 25].) 'l'he Streets 
and Highways Code provides in section 5610 that "The own-
ers of lots . . fronting on any portion of a public street ... 
when that street ... is improved ... , shall maintain any 
sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger 
persons ... " The same eod.e in section 5611 directs that 
"\Vhen any portion of the sidewalk is out of repair ... 
and in condition to endanger persons ... in the use of such 
sidewalk, the superintendent of streets shaH notify the owner 
or person in possession of the property fronting on that 
portion of snell sidewalk so out of: repair, to repair the side-
walk,'' and ( § 5615) ''If the repair is not commenced and 
prosecuted "to completion with due diligence, as required by 
the notice, the superintendent of streets shall forthwith repair 
the sidewalk." (See also, S r.rton v. Brooks (Hl52), 89 Cal. 
2d 153, 157-158 [245 P.2d 49G]; Laurenzi v. Vranizan (1945), 
25 Cal.2d 806, 809-812 [155 P.2d 633]; Schaefer v. Lenahan 
(1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326-327 [146 P.2d 929]; Barton 
v. Capitol Market (1943), 57 Cal.App.2d 516, 517-518 [1] 
[134 P.2d 847].) It follows that by the judgment ent(•red 
in favor of the pedestrian, Mrs. \Vaguer, and against the 
city it became established as a matter of law that the city 
had knowledge or notice o£ the dangerous and defective side-
walk condition and permitted such condition to continue to 
exist beyond a reasonable time and until she was injured 
thereh.>·· Arellano v. City of Burbank (1939), 13 CaL 
2cl 248. 254 [11 [89 P.2d 113].) 
'rhis- eourt I{as spoeifioa1ly dcclarod that ''The duty of 
the landowner is to nse due care not to ereatc or maintain 
a dangerous eondition for the benefit of his property, while 
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that of the is to use due care to discover and remove 
defeetive conditions. [Citations.] Thus, the liability of ead1 
type of defendant is based upon his individual wrongful act 
or and it is possible to havr~ a valid verdid, exonerat-
ing one and holding the other. [Citations.] ... " (Peters 
v. d': San Prancisco (1953), 41 Cal.2d 419, 
428-429 [260 P.2d 55]. 
In the Peters case the city argued that the judgment against 
it should be reversed because there was no judgment against 
the landowner, but we there stated that "\Ve do not agrPe. 
The eity is nuder a duty to keep sidewalks in safe condition, 
it is directly liable to pedestrians for failing to correct a 
condition of which it had llOti(•e, alHl it is not 
relieved of its responsibility in this regard merely beeause 
the eondition was ereated or maintained by a property owner 
who might also he liable to pedestrians for injuries resulting 
therefrom. [Citations.] With regard to persons who are 
injured by such a condition, the city and the landowner are 
joint or concurrent tort feasors; each is direetly liable for 
his own wrong and each may he held liable for the entire 
damage suffered. [Citations.]" (Pete~·s v. City & County of 
San Prancisco (1953), supra, 41 Cal.2d 419, 429 [14, 15, 
16] ; see also, Dottglass v. City of Los Angeles (1935), 5 Cal. 
2d 128, 128 [2] [53 P.2d 353]; Bosq1ri v. City of San Bcnwr-
dino (1935), 2 Ca1.2d 747, 764 [9] [43 P.2d 547]; Marsh v. 
City of Sacramento (1954), 127 Cal.App.2d 721, 723-725 [1] 
[274 P.2d 434]; Wilkes v. City &; Cottniy of San Francisco 
(1041), 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 397 [5] [112 P.2d 759]; "~fulda 
v. City Los Angeles (1930), 110 Cal.App. 663, 668 [294 
P. 485].) Thus, it is not for any aet or neglect of the prop-
erty owner that the city is liable; it is liable, if at all, not on 
and sueh theory as that of respondeat superior, but rathe1·, 
solely for the breaeh of its own duty. And, perhaps more 
important, it must be recognized that the acts of both on"ginal 
defendants (the property owners and the city) were necessary 
to produce the injury to the pedestrian, Mrs. ·wagner. If 
either the property owner or the city had discharged the duty 
respectively imposed on them the accident would not have 
happened. 
Under these eireumstanees it appears to me that to re•1uire 
tlw landowner not merely to answer for his own ncgligeuc~e 
but also to indemnify the eity for its independent tort will 
tend to defeat the Legislature's purpose in making the city 
liable for its own ncgllgenee in failing to vigilantly inspect 
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Jnaintain, or require owners of ahutt prop~ 
sidewalks iJJ a safe condition. H such a 
err:atrd and enforced by this court, a most natural result 
will he ('neouragement of laxity on the part oE the 
out its obligation of inspection, of 
cwd proper maiutenance of sidewalks for the 
of the pubLic. 'l'he proposal of' the city that should be in~ 
denmified by the property owner for what it terms its own 
" " negligence in permitting a dangerous condition to 
eontinue should be promptly and positiYely rejc·ete(l. 
This matter obviously presents no such ease as San Fran-
cisco Unijiecl Sch. Dist. v. California Blclr;. etc. Co. ( 1H58), 
162 Cal.App.2d 434, 443 I5J [328 P.2d 785], ,,·herein the 
eourt expressly reeognized the rule that there is no right 
of eoutribution among joint tort feasors but properly held 
that in the cireumstauces of that case the rule was inappli<:able 
because of the contractual relations of the parties. ''The con~ 
tract ... provided that the [defendant] ... 'is held re-
sponsible for payment of any cmd aU clarnages' resultinu from 
'tts operations. l Italics added.] Even if this did not amount 
to an express contract to indemnify the school disiriet for 
damages caused to it by a breach of the contract by the 
[defendant] ... , such a warranty or agreement to indemnify 
would necessarily be in:1plied. Whether the school district 
[plaintiff] should be precluded from recovery by reason of 
its conduct, that is, whether the conduct of the distriet helped 
to bring about tlte damage, is at least a question of fact and 
should have been left to the jury. Under suc:h cin·um"tanees 
it was error to grant a nonsuit." (Pp. 448~44D of 162 CaL 
App.2d.) 
The case before us not only does not show any agreement 
by the property owners to indemnify the city for the breach 
of its duty but makes clear, as a matter of law, the fact that 
"the conduct of the [city] helped to bring a bout tlJ e damage." 
The case at bar, therefore, is fundamentally indistinguishable 
from, and should be goyerned by, Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. 
Co. (1912), 162 Cal. 136, 138-140 [121 P. 379], and cases 
there cited. (See also 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 413.) In this case, as 
in Dow, the independent negligence of both tort feasors was 
necessar·y to cause the pedestrian's injury. From the faet 
that the judgment in the basic personal injury action was 
entered in favor of the plaintiff therein and has become final 
as against both the city and the property owners, it follows 
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HN H matter of Jaw ( ildYPl'S() to 
the clefendauts in such busi1~ adiou I thai i he sub~ 
jed injury would not haYe O\:enrred i[ ei!lwe (a) the p1·operi,\' 
O\Yll('l' had llOt <:J'eated the eondition or (b) tile ,•ily lm<l not 
permitted the eoudition to eoutinue aftee it had 1Joti1·e and 
\Yas bouwl to corn:d it. Thus the right of' tlw to claim 
ill(1emni:fieation for the eouseqnenres hom its own 
tort is a new right of reeoyery, not heretofore known to the 
law of this state, and it is enforced retroadively the same 
decision which creat\'S it. Snc:h ruling:; should not find favor 
with the c:ourt. 
I ·would affirm the judgment denying reeowry to the (·ity. 
Mc-Comb, ,J., concurred. 
[ Criw. No. 6268. In Bank. Oct. 24, 19;)8.] 
'rHE PEOP11E, Hespondent, v. LUTIIBR POINDEXTER, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Pact-Rea-
sonable Doubt.-The test on appeal is whether there is sub-
stantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, 
not wlwther guilt is cstablisheu bcyonu a rPasonnble doubt. 
[2] Poisons-Offenses-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal.-
"\ convietion of furnishing narcotics to a minor (Health & Saf. 
Code, ~ 1l/14) y;ill not he disturbed on appeal, though there 
was coniiicting testimony as to who supplied the narcotic~, 
whet·e the jury chose to belieYe the minor's version of the 
Ltds, iu1plicating defendant. 
[3] Id.-Oi1enses-Furnlshing Narcotics to Minor-Indictment.-
An indictment for furnishing narcotics to a minor is not 
fatally <kfectivc for failure to include the minor's name. 
[4] !d.-Offenses-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Indictment.-
\VhPre defendant was indicteu for furnishing narcotics to a 
minot', though there were two minors (one since deceased) 
in\"oln•d, the fact that the prosecuting attorney stated in his 
opening and closing arguments that the indictment related 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1314; [2] Poisons, 
§ 16.1; [3, 4] Poisons, ~ 12; [5] Homicide, ~ 146; [6] Homicide, 
~Hi; Poisons,~ 1:); Homicide, S 160; [8] Criminal Law,§ 574; 
[9] Poisons, §Li; [10] Homicide, §189; [11] Homicide, §267; 
[12] Criminal Law,§ 1437(7). 
